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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Nortel2 bankruptcy case is simultaneously the biggest success and 
biggest failure in the recent history of cross-border restructuring practice. 
On the plus side, the coordinated sale of an insolvent telecom firm’s key 
assets created a pool of value worth $7 billion—much larger than could 
have been accomplished through piecemeal local liquidation of spectrum 
licenses and intellectual property rights.3 Indeed, that pool of assets was 
much more valuable than anybody imagined when the firm filed its 
bankruptcy petition. On the minus side, the fights over value allocation 
swallowed up a gargantuan part of that value—an estimated $2.6 billion.4 
 
The fights centered on alleged entitlements to priority—upward 
deviations from equal treatment and pro rata distribution. These fights 
were complicated by Nortel’s structure as a global corporate group. The 
claims were based on, among other things: (1) liens; (2) corporate 
structure; (3) territorial jurisdiction; and (4) local statutory priorities. 
Interactions among these claims to priority made it virtually impossible to 
unscramble the egg.  
 
The court’s answer to the problem, dividing the pool of value amongst 
all proceedings pending for the Nortel group, has been characterized as a 
partial substantive consolidation and has proven controversial. In our 
view, the court’s solution—pari passu distribution by estate—reached the 
right substantive result but got there by the wrong route. By calling the 
approach “partial substantive consolidation,” the court framed its order as 
relying on “substantive consolidation,” an extraordinary remedy that 
 
2 In re Nortel Networks Inc., No. 11-53454(KG), 2016 WL 2584092, at *1 (Bankr. D. DE. 
May 2, 2016). 
3 Id. at *1. 
4 Donald L. Swanson, The Monstrous Costs of Mediation Failures (the Nortel Networks 
Bankruptcy, Part One), AM. BANKR. INST. (last visited Apr. 2, 2020), 
https://www.abi.org/feed-item/the-monstrous-costs-of-mediation-failures-the-nortel-
networks-bankruptcy-part-one. 
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disrespects the corporate form and is available only when the court finds 
bad behavior or disrespect of corporate formalities.5  
 
What actually happened was something far more mundane—a failure 
by the various creditors to establish their claims to priority. The outcome 
in Nortel is a natural incident of any rescue case involving an integrated 
firm. The goal of corporate rescue is to preserve going concern value—the 
surplus value of the consolidated enterprise. This is precisely the 
increment of value that cannot be allocated amongst the various entities in 
a corporate group.  
 
In this paper we propose to rethink the method used to allocate both 
enterprise value and governance power in rescue cases. Our approach 
seeks to simplify value allocation in cases like Nortel without 
disrespecting either the corporate form or disturbing property rights. As an 
added benefit, we seek to correct a “governance” problem that adds 
expense to the coordinated liquidation of consolidated firms and 
endangers rescue in cases where a firm hopes to continue in operation.  
 
As we see it, the common error is that creditors frequently assert 
claims based on a top-down approach to distributional priority that rests 
on a myth—the single distributional waterfall—that simply does not 
reflect reality or the law. As we will discuss later, in multinational cases 
involving corporate groups, claims to priority are plural rather than 
hierarchical. In cases like Nortel, however, when bankruptcy entitlements 
are mistakenly viewed as hierarchical, uncertainty about the location of 
firm value and firm assets creates a knot of veto rights that, as a practical 
matter, inverts the proper legal allocation of governance rights. Under 
corporate law, governance rights generally run from the bottom up, with 
power to decide the firm’s future lying with the fulcrum security or 
residual claimant. By contrast distributional property rights run from the 
top down, with asset-based claims being paid prior to unsecured claims or 
equity. The higher a claimant’s distributional priority the weaker its claim 
to control over the firm’s decisions.  
 
Paradoxically, when a debtor’s value is uncertain, and multiple 
creditors in multiple entities can claim seniority, claims to priority become 
 
5 Nortel Networks Corp. (Re), [2015] ONSC 2987 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.); see Michael 
Barrett, Substantive Consolidation After Nortel: The Treatment of Corporate Groups in 
Canadian Insolvency Law, Insolvency Institute of Canada, available at 
https://www.insolvency.ca/en/whatwedo/resources/SubstantiveConsolidationAfterNortel
_TheTreatmentofCorporateGroupsinCanadianInsolvencyLaw.pdf. 
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veto rights. Multiple nominally senior creditors can use their claims to 
distributional priority to hold a restructuring hostage, regardless of 
whether their priority claim is realizable as a practical matter. The right to 
be paid first becomes the right to decide. But worse, where there are 
multiple such claims, the right to decide becomes a power to obstruct. 
 
We suggest a simple, perhaps naïve, solution to this problem: a creditor 
asserting priority should have the burden of establishing the realizable 
value of its claim. Rather than assuming that the priority of entitlements 
run from the top down, in rescue cases a claim’s priority should be 
established from the bottom up; any claim to distributional entitlement that 
exceeds a pari passu, pro rata distribution must be traced to particular 
encumbered assets, or to enterprise value that can be situated in a distinct 
entity. Further, such claims of priority should be limited to their 
demonstrable realizable value.  
 
This approach has an important practical benefit for governance 
purposes; the veto-power associated with a claim of distributional priority 
is fixed and can be satisfied by payment of the realizable amount. The key 
move here, however, is not substantive consolidation; it is realization. 
Opening a proceeding fixes the relative position of creditors and operates 
as a realization on their collateral. To the extent that rescue increases the 
value of the firm beyond the value of its component parts, that value is 
shared. By shifting the burden of establishing priority, our approach 
ensures that distribution can run from the top down, within entity (and 
territorial) silos, while governance will run from the bottom up, 
maximizing the value of the firm.  
 
One feature of this approach is novel, however. Since priority claims 
are limited to value that can be situated in particular assets or entities, a 
significant portion of the value of the enterprise may be “homeless.” Since 
the firm is insolvent, this is not “equity” that flows up to the parent. 
Instead, it is enterprise value that inheres in the corporate group. Corporate 
law does not, as a formal matter provide a place to put this residual going 
concern value. Corporate groups are not “entities” in any legal sense. 
However, the going concern value of a group is an asset of the group as a 
whole. This pool of enterprise value that cannot be situated in any one 
asset, entity or country constitutes a rump estate that must be shared. 
Crucially, this pool of enterprise or going concern value is not 
extraordinary (as it must be to merit substantive consolidation). Instead, 
its existence is inherent in any rescue regime. The very essence and 
purpose of rescue is to preserve firm specific value, in excess of the sum 
of the parts. To the extent that local assets, entity assets, or liened assets 
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prove insufficient to satisfy the creditor’s claim the deficiency should be 
assertible against that residuum—the “rump estate.” As a practical matter 
this is what happened in Nortel but calling it “substantive consolidation” 
is a misnomer.  
 
This article proceeds in three steps. First, it describes the current 
architecture for dealing with the insolvency of corporate groups and the 
problem posed by cases like Nortel and Lehman. Second, it details the 
various types of claims to priority that can exist within a corporate group 
and explores the nature of priority and develops the concept of “homeless 
value.” Claims to priority may be hierarchical or they may be plural. They 
may be traceable to assets, countries, or entities, or they may inhere in the 
group. Regardless, when a firm continues to operate in bankruptcy, (or is 
sold as a going concern) the relative position of the claimants must be fixed 
at the outset. Thereafter, subject to respecting the priority of the newly 
fixed claims, governance should be situated with the variable claimants to 
this unsituated value—the “rump estate.” These are the claimants who will 
benefit from any increase in value and pay for any decrease. Third, 
working from the general bankruptcy principal of equal treatment or pro 
rata distribution we suggest an approach to value allocation that would 
vastly simplify cases like Nortel, but which also provides a mechanism to 
allocate value in rescue cases where the firm continues to operate. The 
simple point is that priority claimants should have the burden of 
establishing the realizable value of their priority. This establishes an 
entitlement floor for, and limits the veto rights of, these priority claimants. 
As such, it provides a legal default for allocating value in going concern 
sale cases, and a cram-down standard for restructurings.  
II. MODIFIED UNIVERSALISM AND ITS LIMITS: VALUE 
MAXIMIZATION V. VALUE ALLOCATION 
 
The past thirty years have seen a remarkable development of cross-
border practice in insolvency cases. As major global corporate groups have 
failed, administrators and judges around the globe have explored the limits 
of their power to coordinate sales and restructurings in global cases. This 
exploration has occurred largely under the principle of modified 
universalism, a framework built on comity where local courts recognize 
the effects of an insolvency proceeding commenced in one jurisdiction 
336 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV Vol. 27:2 
 
throughout the world.6 Global recognition allows for a coordinated 
approach to realization of the value of the firm for the benefit of all 
creditors, regardless of their respective location. Modified universalism 
contemplates a single proceeding, pending at the debtor’s center of main 
interest (COMI), that administers the firm and realizes on its value 
globally. This global proceeding allows the administrator to pursue value-
maximizing strategies such as a going-concern sale or a recapitalization of 
the firm. Modified universalism forms the basis for both the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, and the European Union 
Insolvency Regulation. Under both instruments local courts are called 
upon to recognize and give effect to the orders of the COMI court. There 
have been some hiccups along the way. For example, coordination is more 
difficult when the members of a corporate group do not share the same 
COMI.7 This has not proven fatal to the overarching vision, however, and 
the recent promulgation of the UNCITRAL Model Law on the Insolvency 
of Corporate Groups should help in this regard.8 
 
Value maximization has been the key driver of, and the payoff for 
adopting the modified universalist approach.9 The legal framework is 
procedural, but the benefits are substantive. Where global restructurings 
have worked, they have been held together by the prospect of mutual 
advantage. This concept of mutual advantage is both a practical corollary 
and legal prerequisite to global cooperation—each creditor must be made 
better off (or at least be “adequately protected”). Obtaining creditor 
support of a collective solution, thus, requires a plan to offer an 
improvement of position over going it alone—a going concern or 
coordination surplus.  
 
However, assuring mutual advantage requires an entitlement baseline, 
both to assure creditors of fair treatment and to prevent creditors from 
 
6 See Jay L. Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
2276, 2299, 2302 (2000); John A. E. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for 
International Bankruptcy, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 935, 992 (2005). But see Lynn M. LoPucki, 
Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post Universalist Approach, 84 CORNELL L. 
REV. 696, 750 (1998-1999). In previous articles, one of us has staked a claim to a slightly 
different type of “universalism,” “universal proceduralism.” See Edward Janger, Universal 
Proceduralism, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 819, 820-21 (2007). For the purposes of this essay, 
the differences are not relevant. More to the point, the proposals discussed in this essay are 
consistent with Universal Proceduralism, and in our view represent a necessary extension 
to Modified Universalism.  
7 See Irit Mevorach, The ‘Home Country‘ of a Multinational Enterprise Group Facing 
Insolvency, ICLQ vol. 57, April 2008 pp 427–448. 
8 See text at note 39, infra. 
9 See e.g., Irit Mevorach, The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency, 14-15 (2018). 
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overreaching each other and the debtor.10 Where there is no entitlement 
baseline, opportunistic use of situational leverage by key suppliers, 
creditors or trading partners to extract concessions may destroy the 
ongoing business, and fights over allocating going concern sale proceeds 
can fritter away any collective benefit. As Nortel illustrates, fights over 
allocating the additional increment of value created by a global insolvency 
solution can endanger orderly resolution. Unfortunately, modified 
universalism does not provide a mechanism or a basis for resolving 
disputes about either how to maximize value (governance) or value 
allocation (priority). Instead, it sits atop a congeries of corporate 
governance regimes and systems of territorial priority, buoyed by the hope 
that the parties and courts will work it out. To accomplish this, modified 
universalism relies on broad principles like comity and adequate 
protection. Miraculously, sometimes it works out, but it can get messy 
(and expensive).  
a. Value allocation and governance: the twin blind spots of 
modified universalism 
i. Value Allocation and the Empty Core 
 
As noted above, Nortel may serve as the best example for both the 
success and failure of the modified; universalist approach. Instead of 
liquidating the assets of the firm separately—as they were spread around 
the world, Nortel’s administrators followed a coordinated strategy and 
pooled the firm’s key assets (spectrum and intellectual property licenses) 
which allowed them to sell these assets in a single auction. Here, 
competing bids of major market participants drove the price up to 
unforeseen levels and generated about $7 billion in cash.11 Value-
maximization happened. The modified universalist idea worked. 
 
Nortel also provides the most vivid demonstration of the weak spot in 
today’s international framework of cross-border insolvency. Modified 
universalism lacks a global substantive legal framework for allocating the 
excess value created by resolving the firm as an integrated whole. Once 
the proceeds of the coordinated sale were locked in an escrow account, the 
fight over value allocation began on a global scale. In Nortel, this fight 
lasted for more than 8 years and generated costs estimated at $2.6 billion.12 
 
10 Edward Janger, Silos: Establishing the Distributional Baseline in Cross-Border 
Bankruptcies, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 180, 181-82 (2014). 
11 Nortel, supra note 2, at *2. 
12 Id. at *16. 
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A significant piece of that fight was due to US bondholders, who hoped to 
receive larger distributions in the US than their Canadian or European 
counterparts. After a costly attempt at mediation failed,13 the Canadian and 
US courts solved this problem through a mechanism they called partial 
substantive consolidation.14 The various estates shared pro rata in the value 
of the assets of the company. Equality of distribution trumped claims to 
priority based on nationality.15 
 
A second example of the problem of value allocation in cross-border 
cases arose in the Lehman bankruptcy.16 Lehman Brothers was a complex 
global business.17 In order to keep track of its money, it had a centralized 
cash management system.18 Operating funds were disbursed to 
subsidiaries on a daily basis, but overnight they were returned to a central 
account, managed out of London.19 When Lehman failed, disputes arose 
as to whether funds were located in the subsidiaries all over the world, or 
centralized in the subsidiary in London that operated the cash management 
system. Significant assets were spent trying to answer the question, but at 
the end of the day, the result was indeterminate. The money was in the 
firm, but not in any one subsidiary at any one moment. 
 
The difficulty in both cases was that money could not be distributed 
to creditors until these disputes over priority were resolved. On the one 
hand, the cases were successful at liquidating the businesses without 
disputes over allocation standing in the way. On the other hand, the 
 
13 Steven Church, Nortel Mediation Over Splitting $9 Billion Extended by Judge, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 22, 2013, 6:51 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-
01-22/nortel-mediation-over-splitting-9-billion-extended-by-judge-1-; Donald L. 
Swanson, The Monstrous Cost of Mediation Failures (the Nortel Networks Bankruptcy, 
Part One), ABI, https://www.abi.org/feed-item/the-monstrous-costs-of-mediation-
failures-the-nortel-networks-bankruptcy-part-one.  
14 Id. at *1-2. 
15 Peg Brickley, Nortel Creditors Fail to Reach Deal on How to Split $7.3 Billion, WALL 
ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2016, 5:36 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/nortel-creditors-fail-to-reach-
deal-on-how-to-split-7-3-billion-1475876175.  
16 Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v. BNY Corp. Tr. Serv. Ltd. (In re Lehman Bros. 
Holdings Inc.), 422 B.R. 407, 416 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
17 Richard Herring, The Challenge of Resolving Cross-Border Financial Institutions, 31 
YALE J. ON REG., 853, 867 (2014). 
18 Id. at 870. 
19 Id.; see also Richard S. Miller et al., Lessons of the Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy: Global 
Cash Management v. Legal Provincialism in Global Financial Markets – Legal, Policy and 
Regulatory Analysis, 1 K & L GATES 1, 6-7 (2008), available at 
http://www.klgates.com/global-financial-markets--legal-policy-and-regulatory-analysis-
11-17-2008/#lessons.  
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absence of a robust set of rules for allocation made it extremely expensive 
to figure out how to distribute the proceeds. 
 
Nortel and Lehman demonstrate that, in global group cases, the 
increment of untraceable value can be quite large, even when the value is 
in the form of relatively discrete assets—cash, or the proceeds from the 
sale of spectrum licenses. For many firms much of the firm’s value will 
inhere in income generated by operations—the “going concern value” of 
the firm. The increment of extra value that is generated by continuing the 
operation of the business will often, by definition, be impossible to allocate 
to a particular piece of property or to situate in a particular subsidiary or 
country. When there are multiple claims to an undifferentiated pot of 
money, then it is worth fighting over. And, when there is no principled 
basis for distributing that pot, the allocation is necessarily arbitrary. 
Moreover, negotiations among multiple claimants about “dividing the 
dollars” frequently end in what game theorists call an “empty core,” with 
the various stakeholders caught in an endless cycle of negotiation.20  
ii. Governance and Situational Leverage 
 
The value allocation questions in both Nortel and Lehman arose after 
the estate had realized on the value of the various businesses. This is not 
always the case. Allocation questions may also arise in the midst of efforts 
to keep the business afloat. The confounding of governance and allocation 
is made worse when the claims of entitlement are used opportunistically 
to hold a restructuring hostage to a reordering of the bankruptcy priority 
scheme. In the US, a common issue is the need to pay “critical vendors.”21 
Sometimes a key supplier or trading partner will refuse to do business with 
the reorganizing debtor unless prepetition debts are paid in full. 
Technically, this is a violation of the automatic stay, but the need to 
preserve the trading relationship will often override the protection of the 
stay. A similar example arises when airlines wish to honor their frequent 
flyer mile program, or stores wish to honor their gift certificates in order 
to maintain and preserve customer goodwill. As a practical matter, courts 
routinely approve payments to such creditors. The basis for doing so is 
unclear. Some US courts rely on 11 U.S.C. 105 and the so-called “doctrine 
 
20 See generally Kenneth A. Shepsle, ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, AND 
INSTITUTIONS (2d. ed. 2010) (explaining the idea about empty core and the divide of the 
dollars claim); see Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119 YALE 
L.J. 648, 687-98 (2010). Edward J. Janger, The Costs of Liquidity Enhancement: 
Transparency Cost, Risk Alteration, and Coordination Problems, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. 
& COM. L. 39 (2009).  
21 See, e.g., In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 868–72 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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of necessity.”22 Other courts rely on 11 U.S.C. 363(c) and the power to use 
and sell property of the estate in the “ordinary course.”23 Neither rationale 
is particularly satisfying, but, again, the practice is common. Courts in 
other jurisdictions follow a similar line.24 
 
Situational leverage is often a feature in the negotiation of debtor-in-
possession financing. For example, in the Lyondell case, the court 
approved a post-petition financing order under which, for each dollar 
loaned on a secured basis, a dollar of unsecured prepetition debt would 
also be rolled into the secured claim. 25 In other words, for each dollar 
loaned, the debtor put up two dollars in collateral, one of which secured 
the new money, and the other of which secured a previously unsecured 
loan. The terms were extraordinarily generous, and the willingness of the 
debtor to make such a promise flowed from the debtor’s acute need for 
cash during the early stages of the case. 26 
 
Debtor and judicial acquiescence to situational leverage also play a 
role in cross-border restructurings. As Judge Gropper has pointed out, 
“The usual practice is for U.S. debtors to pay all foreign creditors, not 
merely priority creditors.”27 In other words, when a multinational 
enterprise files for bankruptcy in the US and there is a desire to keep the 
business operating, instead of relying on the protection of the automatic 
stay the usual practice is simply to keep paying the foreign creditors, 
notwithstanding that this prefers their prepetition claims over other 
creditors who are not being paid.  
 
 
22 In re Just for Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. 821, 824–25 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999). 
23 In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 868–72 (7th Cir. 2004); In re Lehigh and New England 
Ry. Co., 657 F.2d 570, 581 (3d Cir. 1981); In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 467 F.2d 100, 
102 (3d Cir. 1972); In re Just for Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. 821, 823–25 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999); 
In re Columbia Gas Sys., Inc., 171 B.R. 189, 191–92 (Bankr. D. Del. 1994). 
24 See e.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 11, 2004 – IX ZR 
22/03 (Ger.) Enabling such payments based on a test of them being beneficial for the 
overall estate similar to the “doctrine of necessity.” 
25 Final Order (I) Authorizing Debtors (A) To Obtain Postpetition Financing, (B) To Utilize 
Cash Collateral and (C) To Purchase Certain Assets and (II) Granting Adequate Protection 
to Prepetition Secured Parties at 62, In re Lyondell Chem. Co., Case No. 09-10023 (REG) 
(Mar. 1, 2009) [docket no. 1002]; see also, Shapiro v. Saybrook Mfg. Co., 963 F.2d 1490 
(11th Cir. 1992); Texlon (couldn’t find cite to case). 
26 Nicole M. Stephansen, Roll-up Financing Gains Prominence, LEXOLOGY (June 15, 
2010), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=cf36dbad-7ef5-4c72-a87c-
2cdce2840e85.  
27 Hon. Allan Gropper, The Payment of Priority Claims in Cross-Border Insolvency Cases, 
46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 559, 571 (2011). 
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Further, as one of us has noted in a previous article, secured creditors 
frequently use their leverage to force a quick going concern sale. Such 
sales often allocate all of the sale proceeds to the secured creditor claiming 
a blanket lien, even where a more time consuming recapitalization of the 
firm might have produced more value, and careful attention to procedure 
and entitlements might have allowed value to flow through to the other 
creditors. 28 Indeed, the US Supreme Court has recently recognized that it 
is problematic when critical vendor motions, sales, structured dismissals 
and other devices operate as end runs around the prescribe process for 
confirming a plan of reorganization.29 
iii. Process v. Substance 
 
In sum, modified universalism provides a procedure for coordinating 
a case, but leaves decision-making and value allocation as open questions. 
The principle of adequate protection nods in the direction of substantive 
fairness,30 but the concept leaves many questions open. To what extent can 
stakeholders insist on claims to priority as a baseline for their entitlement? 
What law governs priority? How should claims to priority be valued, and 
how should competing claims of priority be ordered? 
b. Adequate protection and the problem of value allocation in 
rescue 
 
For the modified universalist, and particularly for the court hosting the 
main proceeding in a cross-border case, understanding the relationship 
between the entitlement floor for and the likelihood of international 
recognition is crucial. The concept of adequate protection used by the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency (the “MLCBI”)31 
leaves at least two crucial questions unanswered, however: (1) should the 
forum court apply its own priorities to distributional disputes or the 
priorities that would apply to the claim; and (2) how should these priorities 
be applied in rescue? 
 
28 Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process 
in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862 (2014) (discussing the transactional leverage 
of secured creditors to disadvantage other claimants). 
29Czyewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 984-86 (2017). 
30 Modified universalism also contemplates mechanisms for coordination, access and 
participation. These build out the procedural framework, while adequate protection assures 
that the process remains fair, and does not fundamentally disturb substantive rights. 
31 G.A. Res. 52/158, Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, (May 30, 1997); 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 1501-1532. 
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i. Territoriality and Allocation 
 
Historically, insolvency law’s approach to value allocation has relied 
on two defaults: liquidation and territorialism. Value has been allocated to 
claims based on the location of the assets generating value and distributed 
to the creditors able to assert their claims in the proceeding. In a piecemeal 
liquidation, all value that is generated can easily be traced to the asset sold. 
There is no extra value. The location of an asset may therefore easily work 
as the (only) determinant for allocation of the value received from its sale. 
Territorial insolvency proceedings would claim and distribute the value of 
assets in their territory to creditors with a claim against the debtor firm. 
The European Insolvency Regulation (EIR) provides for this exact rule in 
its original art. 2(g)32 and maintained this baseline rule in its recast art. 2 
(9) (vii).33 
 
Such rules for allocation of assets are often local rules, though 
sometimes they have regional character (as art. 2 EIR).34 In a global 
dispute about allocation, however, they cannot govern the outcome of the 
dispute for all participants. In addition, such rules have not yet been 
developed for all kinds of assets, and even where they address specific 
assets classes (e.g. Art. 2 (9) with different rules applied to registered 
assets, financial instruments, cash, intellectual property, tangible property 
and claims), they were not designed to be applied in a group scenario 
where gaming these rules is easy.35 Lacking any coherent global standard, 
the international practice has required the parties to negotiate a distribution 
scheme by themselves. However, such a contract amongst more than two 
parties is not easy to negotiate.  
 
Global rescue challenges both the liquidation and the territorial 
paradigm. Because the debtor continues in operation, the value of assets 
conceptually (but not legally) merges into the value of the firm. Because 
the enterprise is global, the territorial approach is disrupted by the 
reallocation of assets both before and after commencement of main 
proceedings abroad, especially in a group context. Assets may be moved 
from one jurisdiction to another for financial or tax reasons. They also may 
 
32 Commission Regulation, 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000, On Insolvency Proceedings, O.J. 
(L 160) 1, 5 (EC). 
33 Commission Regulation 2015/848 of 20 May, 2015, Insolvency Proceedings, 2015 O.J. 
(L141) 19, 19-72. 
34 Id. 
35 Case C-649/13, Comité d’entreprise de Nortel Networks SA and Others, 2015 E.C.R. 1. 
(addressing the resulting disputes about allocation). 
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move within the group from entity to entity. The location of intangible 
assets is difficult to determine. Worse yet, not all of the value of the firm 
that continues to operate can be tied to particular assets.36 While the 
common approach seeks to bring the value of an operating cross border 
business “down to earth” by attaching it to assets, this is a fiction. The 
value actually remains “in the air.” 
ii. Facilitating a Global Cross Border Consensus 
 
Adjacent to the cross-border architecture, many jurisdictions seek to 
solve the allocation problem with ADR instruments. Mediation and 
arbitration of a cross border value distribution scheme is advised and 
sometimes even practically required. In Nortel, mediation and arbitration 
were the first choice after initial negotiations stalled. Without a mechanism 
for establishing the entitlement baseline, however, they failed.37 
 
Under the existing Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency, a plan of 
reorganization promulgated by the court at the debtor’s COMI will be 
recognized so long as the interests of creditors are “adequately 
protected.”38 UNCITRAL has recently proposed two new instruments to 
enhance the recognition regime of the original Model Law. The recently 
promulgated UNCITRAL Model Laws on the Insolvency of Enterprise 
Groups aims at supporting the recognition process for plans of 
reorganization promulgated for the entire group. This new instrument 
seeks to facilitate the coordinated adoption of a global distribution scheme 
by using local (territorial) recognition to enforce plans or reorganization.39 
Under this model, parties would attempt to structure a “group solution” 
formulated in one jurisdiction – a planning proceeding—to be recognized 
locally in as many other jurisdictions as possible.40  
 
 
36 See Edward J. Janger, The Logic and Limits of Liens, 2 U. OF ILL. L. REV. 589 (2015); 
See also, Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Tracing Equity: Realizing and Allocating 
Value in Chapter 11, 96 TEX. L. REV. 673 (2018). 
37Steven Church, Nortel Mediation Over Splitting $9 Billion Extended by Judge, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 22, 2013 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-01-
22/nortel-mediation-over-splitting-9-billion-extended-by-judge-1-; Donald Swanson, The 
Monstrous Costs of Mediation Failures (the Nortel Networks Bankruptcy, Part One), 
AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE, https://www.abi.org/feed-item/the-monstrous-costs-
of-mediation-failures-the-nortel-networks-bankruptcy-part-one.  
38 Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency Article 22.  
39 Int’l Trade Law Comm’n, Rep of Working Group V (Insolvency Law) on the Work of 
Its Fifty-Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/972 at 18-20 (2019). 
40 Article 27 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on the Insolvency of Enterprise Groups 
(available at: https://undocs.org/en/A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.165).  
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This approach relies on the ability of receiving jurisdictions to develop 
local procedures to approve and implement the group solution, and to give 
meaning to the concept of “adequate protection.” Some jurisdictions might 
require a local vote to bind local creditors. Other jurisdictions might be 
more permissive, choosing to recognize the global solution because local 
creditors had adequate opportunity to participate, and the solution is in the 
best interest of the local claimants. Also, a confirmed plan could be 
recognized across the globe, thus giving its distributional solution the 
aspired global effect. The court confirming the proposed plan would, 
however, need to apply the local tests reflecting the distributional 
standards in its jurisdiction.41 This approach addresses the problem of 
recognition without addressing the underlying problem of entitlement. It 
remains to be seen whether host (receiving) jurisdictions will actually 
recognize plans based on foreign distributional standards without 
safeguards for their local entitlement policies. 
 
As such, the UNCITRAL architecture can facilitate the recognition of 
a global solution and provides a forum for bargaining in the shadow of 
entitlement, it does not provide a set of entitlements, or a mechanism for 
resolving disputes when claims of entitlement differ along national lines. 
III. ENTITLEMENT AND GOVERNANCE IN GLOBAL 
BANKRUPTCY CASES 
 
As noted above, the global bankruptcy architecture developed by 
UNCITRAL does not provide a mechanism for resolving questions of 
priority. Instead, it takes claims to priority as it finds them. Cases like 
Nortel and Lehman demonstrate the costs of such an approach. The 
problem faced by a judge or mediator in a global rescue case is that there 
 
41 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments, Art. 13 (Vienna: United 
Nations, 2018), 
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/Interim_MLIJ.pdf; United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law, Enterprise Group Insolvency: Draft Model 
Law, art. 20 (Vienna: United Nations, 2018), 
https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/draft_model_law_on_enterprise_group_i
nsolvency_0.pdf. In the US, the confirmation would need to follow the requirements of 11 
U.S.C. § 1129 and include a best interest test as well as the application of the absolute 
priority rule. In other jurisdictions other tests may be required. In addition, the decision to 
recognize a foreign plan in a host jurisdiction would commonly include a test of adherence 
to local distributional standards, either following a specific provision (see e.g., 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1507) or based on a public policy requirement (see e.g. art. 34 EIR). Globally uniform 
distributional standards are non- existent. 
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may be multiple bases for claims to priority, and it is difficult to 
disentangle them. 
a. Entitlement: Equality v. Priority 
 
There are essentially two approaches to such distributional questions 
that could have resolved the allocative uncertainty that bedeviled Nortel 
more simply: a presumption of equality (bottom up); or a clear system of 
priority (top down). Broadly speaking, bankruptcy favors equality (pari 
passu treatment and pro rata distribution).42 By contrast transactional 
lawyers, bankers, and most finance and law and econ theorists favor 
priority and assert the desirability, under non-bankruptcy law, of a 
“hierarchical” capital structure—a single waterfall, where A is paid in full 
before B receives anything, and who must be paid in full before C takes 
anything. 43 
For single solvent companies the difference matters little. Distribution 
runs from the top, governance from the bottom. The distributional 
waterfall situates governance control in the hands of the junior-most class 
(common equity).44 Hierarchy—the distributional waterfall—serves only 
to distinguish fixed claimants with priority—who will be paid in full—
from the claimant at the bottom, whose claim is variable and therefore 
faces and benefits from the risks of continued operation. 45 For solvent 
firms, the levels of hierarchy are irrelevant. Equity is variable; debt 
(regardless of its priority) is fixed. 
b. Priority v. Governance in Insolvency–The Problem of 
Vetoes 
In insolvency and its vicinity, even for a simple firm without 
subsidiaries or international operations, the implications of the two 
approaches diverge. Indeed, they invert and go to war. The wedge is 
uncertainty–specifically uncertainty about valuation in the future. In the 
 
42 Worsley v. DeMattos, 97 Eng. Rep. 407, 412 (K.B. 1758). See Edward J. Janger, The 
Creditors' Bargain Reconstituted: Comments on Barry Adler's The Creditors' Bargain 
Revisited, 167 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE (2019). Some recent commentators question the 
importance of equality of treatment, and the pari passu baseline in particular. David A. 
Skeel, The Empty Idea of “Equality of Creditors,” 166 U. PA. L. REV. 699 (2018); Rizwan 
Jameel Mokal, Priority as Pathology: The pari passu Myth, 60 CAMB. L.J. 581 (2001).  
43 Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Tracing Equity: Realizing and Allocating Value 
in Chapter 11, 96 TEX. L. REV. 673, 677 (2018.) 
44 Id. at 689. 
45 Peter Moles & Nicholas Terry, THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL TERMS 
(Oxford University Press 1995) (shareholders are entitled to the remaining assets once the 
fixed claims on a business have been met). 
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vicinity of insolvency, a firm is not certain to be able to pay its fixed 
claimants in full. It is, therefore, no longer clear who is variable, who is 
fixed, and who is out of the money. Worse yet, in a hierarchical 
distributional scheme, where every claim is potentially variable, 
everybody has a veto over the continued operation of the firm. Instead of 
governance running from the bottom up, veto power runs from the top 
down. Priority claimants must be assured that they will be paid in full 
before governance power moves down to the next rung on the priority 
ladder. By contrast, in a regime of equality, all claimants share equally in 
the future of the firm, and decisions about value maximization are 
unconflicted, but priority is not respected. In a regime that respects 
priority, conditions of uncertainty mean that veto rights will run from the 
top down. The choice between equality and priority is, therefore, fraught. 
c. Priority in the Insolvency of Global Groups: A Taxonomy 
 
To make matters worse, the top down approach to governance 
assumes a single waterfall. The problem posed by global enterprises like 
Nortel with an integrated business that operates with multiple functional 
and national subsidiaries is that multiple distributional waterfalls are 
inevitable. Each subsidiary has its own distributional waterfall. Each 
country has its own jurisdictional power over local assets and claims. Each 
asset may be subject to multiple claims of ownership. Untangling these 
claims to priority is complicated, and inevitable. Before they can be 
disentangled, it is necessary to identify the various types of priority. Stated 
briefly they are: (1) asset-based priority (security); (2) structural priority 
(corporate form); (3) territorial priority (based on jurisdictional control 
over assets and priority of local claims) and (4) value-based or waterfall 
priority (priority creditors, general unsecured creditors, and equity). Each 
of these claims establishes its priority in a different way, and, except for 
waterfall priority, each relies on non-bankruptcy entitlements that are 




Secured creditors have claims to priority that are based on a claim to 
“ownership” or a property interest in the debtor’s assets.46 The debtor can 
bind the secured creditor by redeeming the collateral at its value. This may 
be considerably less than at par. This is because these claims to priority 
 
46 U.C.C § 9-109(a) (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 1977).  
2020 SOLVING NORTEL 347 
 
are based on non-bankruptcy property law: the state law of real property 
mortgages; and the state law of personal property security (Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code in the U.S.). Similar rules exist in many 
jurisdictions including, for instance, Germany.47 What they offer are not 
liens on the value of the firm itself, but instead liens on the firm’s specific 
assets. 
 
For this reason, the claim to priority is limited to the value of the 
investor’s collateral—the encumbered assets.48 Practitioners and law and 
economics scholars frequently assume that it is possible to encumber the 
going concern value of a firm and assert that as a normative matter that 
this is desirable. However, at least in the US, the limits of the property-
based approach found in Article 9, and the absence of a statutory “floating 
charge” that reaches going concern value, together limit the scope of 
security to “property” owned by the firm.49 Even the scholars who favor 
such a lien recognize that it either does not exist under current law, or at 
least rests on a “shaky foundation.”50 
 
 
47 In Germany, property law defines such security, See §§ §§ 1113-1203 BGB (Civil Code) 
for mortgages and §§ 1204-1296 BGB for pledges. 
48 11 U.S.C. § 506, 552, 1129(b)(2)(A) (2010). See Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, 
Tracing Equity: Realizing and Allocating Value in Chapter 11, 96 TEX. L. REV. 673 (2018). 
49 Sarah Paterson, Finding Our Way: Secured Transactions and Corporate Bankruptcy 
Law and Policy an America and England, 18 J. OF CORP. L. STUD. 247 (2018). 
50 Christopher W. Frost, Secured Credit and Effective Entity Priority, 51 CONN. L. REV. 
575, 612 (2019) (“effective entity priority rests on a fragile footing”). While Douglas Baird 
acknowledges that: 
A secured creditor's right is asset-based. A creditor is truly senior to another creditor 
in a firm only to the extent that it has perfected a security interest in each and every 
asset of the firm. Moreover, even if assets are not valued until the plan is confirmed, 
the secured creditor's priority is limited to assets in which it had a perfected security 
interest at the time the petition was filed, or assets acquired with the proceeds of that 
security interest. 
Id. at 856. But he also notes that:  
Whether one looks at a secured creditor as holding the discrete parts worth less than 
the going concern or whether it enjoys a right to the first cashflows of the firm is a 
debate that will undoubtedly continue. Resolving these competing views is virtually 
impossible. Both sides cling to their views as if they were articles of religious faith. 
On the one hand are those who believe that when stock is taken in bankruptcy, no one 
should be able to enjoy the assets to the absolute exclusion of other stakeholders. On 
the other hand are those who believe that stakeholders have a place in line, and the 
bankruptcy reckoning should respect it. The gap between these two views is likely 
unbridgeable. 
Id. at 860.  
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ii. Territoriality – Jurisdiction over property and priority 
of local claims 
 
Territorial claims to priority rely partly on the limited jurisdictional 
scope of the bankruptcy proceeding, and partly on the fact that countries 
may rank priorities differently.51 This can reorder the priority of claims in 
two distinct ways. First, within a firm, the balance of claims and assets can 
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In other words, the opening of a local 
case may distort the “equal” priority of pari passu claims across the firm. 
General creditors in one jurisdiction may receive a larger haircut than 
claimants from another jurisdiction. Also, preferential or priority creditors 
in one jurisdiction may have different (or no) priority in another. 
Employee claims, tax claims, tort claims may all have different priorities 
in different jurisdictions. This highlights the fact that where territorial 
claims are involved, the distributional hierarchy must accommodate 
multiple distributional waterfalls. Even a fully implemented regime of 
modified universalism must wrestle with this problem unless it is prepared 
to reject the concept of local priorities entirely.  
iii. Groups – Corporate Form and Structural Priority 
 
There is yet a third form of priority—structural priority. Whereas the 
usual rule for general unsecured creditors of an insolvent entity is that they 
share pari passu (in equal priority) and pro rata (according to the 
proportion of their claim), the corporate form can be used to structure 
recourse.52 Formal partitions between assets can be created through the use 
of the corporate form. Corporate structure can be used to elevate the 
priority of claimants with recourse to the partitioned assets. However, as 
Nortel and Lehman illustrate, in many modern corporate groups, it is often 
difficult to discern where value is located. Are the receivables of a 
particular subsidiary always tied directly to that subsidiary? Is the 
subsidiary itself solvent? These questions become important when a 
corporate group is recapitalized or sold as a going concern. To what extent 
can a creditor of a group member show that they would have received a 
bigger distribution if their recourse was limited to the subsidiary going it 
alone? Again, like territorial claims to priority or preferred treatment, these 
claims to priority are not based on the host nation’s bankruptcy priority 
 
51 Edward J. Janger, Silos: Establishing the Distributional Baseline in Cross-Border 
Bankruptcies, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 180 (2014).  
52 Anthony J. Casey, The New Corporate Web: Tailored Entity Partitions and Creditors’ 
Selective Enforcement 124 YALE L.J. 2680 (2015). 
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scheme per se, but instead on the fact that a group member exists as a 
separate value waterfall entirely. 
iv. Unsecured Priority Claims and Equity 
 
All of the types of priority described above operate by deleting assets 
from the pool available for pro rata distribution. They carve assets out of 
the estate and dedicate them to satisfying a particular claim. Unsecured 
creditors have a claim against the leftovers—the residual unencumbered 
value of the firm. However, even within the class of claims that lack 
collateral or a dedicated pool of assets, there may be priorities. 
Administrative claims of the estate take priority over employee claims, 
take priority over tax claims take priority over ordinary debt claims.53 And, 
needless to say, ordinary debt claims take priority over equity interests. 
While the basic bankruptcy principal of distribution is equality, the amount 
left over to distribute to those claimants may be quite small or quite large. 
d. Vetoes and Realizable Value 
 
The lesson of the preceding section is that the idea of a single priority 
waterfall is a myth, both as a legal and a practical matter. Instead, the 
various claims to priority create a series of veto rights, each with the power 
to block both a value maximizing rescue and a consensual distribution 
scheme in a sale case. 
 
The myth of waterfall priority has costs. Modern bankruptcy practice 
has shifted its emphasis from liquidation to rescue in the form of 
restructuring and going concern sales.54 This shift causes uncertainty and 
confusion about claims to priority that arise on a number of axes: (1) there 
is confusion about the nature of the entitlements that give rise to various 
types of priority; (2) there is conflation of the nominal and realizable value 
of those claims to priority. The exorbitant cost of cases like Nortel, and 
also in cases where the business continues, comes from these intertwined 
uncertainties about valuation and allocation. Where uncertainty is linked 
to a formal priority, the result is a veto right to any approach that has a 
consensual solution at its core. Where the veto cannot be satisfied by 
payment in full, disputes hinder efficient solutions. In cases like Nortel the 
 
53 11 U.S.C. § 507. 
54 We recognize that Nortel was a liquidation and that In Lehman the fight was over the 
location of particular assets. The point in those cases, was that in a modern corporate group, 
even hard assets may be difficult to locate. In a rescue case, one of those elements of 
homeless value is the going concern increment.  
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result is that value is allocated to lawyers. In cases where rescue is in the 
balance the result may be destruction of value altogether. 
e. Allocation Is Not the Answer 
 
The EIR takes one approach to this problem. It seeks (1) to solve the 
territoriality problem by developing globally or regionally accepted 
allocation rules (e.g. art. 2 (9) EIR) that pin both assets and claims to a 
specific jurisdiction (including those of group entities); and (2) it applies 
local rules on entitlement and distribution to solve questions about the 
scope of security rights or waterfall entitlements. The European approach 
establishes both allocation rules and seeks to respect local distribution 
rules.  
 
The limits of this approach become visible, however, when value 
cannot be traced to specific assets and thus cannot be allocated. Just as a 
firm is worth more than the value of its assets, a corporate group is worth 
more than the sum of the value of its subsidiaries. As a result, the existence 
of a pool of homeless value (In particular reorganization surplus value and 
group synergy value) is an inevitable consequence of rescue and not 
covered neatly by an approach that is based on priority. Such an approach 
must bring value “down to earth” and assign it to a local distributional 
framework. Such a step is artificial and often arbitrary. A new approach is 
needed. 
IV. A NEW APPROACH TO VALUE TRACING IN CORPORATE 
GROUP INSOLVENCIES 
 
The great success of modified universalism is that it provides a process 
to facilitate value maximization by preserving enterprise value either 
through global recapitalization or coordinated going concern sales. The 
greatest weakness is its silence on substance. The standard of adequate 
protection provides no basis for breaking deadlocks when negotiations 
fail.  
 
We suggest a simple, perhaps naïve, mechanism for balancing claims 
to priority against the principle of equal distribution: we would grant a 
claim priority only to the extent that the claimant is able to establish the 
realizable value of that claim in the absence of the global resolution of the 
firm’s value. To put it concretely:  
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• Any claim to priority must be traced to realizable assets or to 
value that can be situated in a distinct jurisdiction or entity and 
distributed according to the respective local distribution 
regime. This, of course, might include local avoidance rules.  
 
• Any remaining homeless, or un-situated value would 
constitute what we call the “rump estate,” a residual pool of 
value, left in the hands of the estate fiduciary. This would not 
be a result of consolidation. It would simply be an incident of 
rescue. 
 
• To the extent that local assets, entity assets, or liened assets 
prove insufficient to satisfy the creditor’s claim they would 
have a deficiency claim against the residuum. This rump 
estate would then be shared on a pro rata basis amongst all 
creditors with deficiency claims. 
 
This approach provides both a cap and a floor to the priority claim. 
Therefore, for governance purposes, the veto power associated with a 
claim of distributional priority is fixed and limited to this realizable 
amount. 
 
Crucially, this approach does not require consolidation, disrespect of 
the corporate form, or of abrogation of property rights. The key move here 
is not consolidation; it is realization. The sale or recapitalization of the 
firm creates a pool of realized value. Priority claimants can claim their 
share, but only if they can prove it is theirs. This approach respects the 
distributional priority of asset-based claims based on liens, and entity-
based priority based on local corporate law, and territorial priority based 
on jurisdictional authority. When an estate fiduciary realizes on the value 
of the enterprise, it distributes the pool of value according to those 
priorities, but only to the extent their realizable value can be established.  
The residuum, the money left over, must go somewhere. So must the debt. 
However, these deficiency claims have no particular claim to priority over 
other unsecured claims, and they are not tied to assets or entities. These 
deficiency claims share pro rata.  
 
By shifting the burden of establishing priority, Our approach ensures that 
distribution can run from the top down, while governance will run from 
the bottom up; by fixing the value of the priority claims they can be cashed 
out, leaving the residual claimants to maximize the value of the enterprise 
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as a whole. It is our hope that this approach will minimize the stakes, and 
hence the costs of allocation fights. 
 
As we have noted, this approach mirrors the distributional approach 
reached in Nortel. But, in our view, “partial substantive consolidation” is 
a misnomer. It suggests that the court is invoking an extraordinary remedy 
that disrespects the corporate form. Under our approach, no disrespect is 
involved. We merely impose a requirement of proof and recognize that 
some value cannot be situated. In our view, the problem lies not in 
consolidating the pool of assets across corporate limits, but more generally 
in fixing the claims to priority based on the realizable value of those asset-
based, entity-based, or jurisdiction-claims to priority. Equality of 
treatment solves the rest. 
a. Fixing the Realizable Value of Priority Claims 
 
A corporate group has aspects of separateness, but also operates, at 
some level as a single entity or firm. Where liabilities and value can be 
located in particular entities the analysis is straightforward. Those claims 
may be satisfied out of that entity based on the realizable value of the 
entity’s assets or the realizable stand-alone value of the entity. Any 
deficiency continues as an orphan claim. Since recourse against the assets 
or entity have been exhausted, and the “group” is not an entity, there is no 
recourse against the group per se. Similarly, while many assets and much 
firm value may be situated in single entities, jurisdictions, or may be 
pledged to particular creditors, some assets may be homeless (like the cash 
in Lehman), and some value may not be tied to assets. This forms what we 
have referred to as the “rump estate.” Most importantly, going concern 
value and various business synergies inhere in the firm. We are left with 
orphan claims and homeless value.  
 
For individual firms this analysis is straightforward. Where a group of 
entities form a consolidated enterprise, however, the analysis is more 
problematic. The homeless value may inhere in the group, rather than any 
particular corporate entity. However, corporate law does not provide a 
place to put this value. For a solvent firm, this value would flow up to the 
corporate parent as equity. If the entities themselves are insolvent, the 
stock is worthless. This will be true, even when the consolidated enterprise 
has value over and above the value of the group members. The question 
becomes how to administer the homeless value and orphan claims that 
inhere in a rescue case. 
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In a rescue case for a corporate group, the orphan claims should be 
assertible against the rump estate. Each claim to priority against a group 
member or assets of a group member is limited to the realizable value of 
that priority claim, based either on the value of their encumbered asset, or 
the realizable value of their claim against a particular entity. To the extent 
that funds remain, all deficiency claims against the various estates would 
be assertible against the rump estate.  
b. The “Rump Estate”  
 
The key point is that any creditor claiming a preference over pro rata 
distribution should have to prove the realizable value of their priority 
claim. Secured creditors’ priority would be allowed based on the realizable 
value of their collateral according to the non-bankruptcy rules applicable 
to such a realization. Creditors claiming a preference under a specific 
territorial priority rule would need to demonstrate the realizable value of 
this priority relying on assets covered by the respective jurisdiction. 
Creditors claiming priority based on assets partitioned in a particular entity 
would also need to demonstrate the realizable value of their claim. 
 
It is possible that some group members may be solvent. If there 
happens to be surplus value attached to assets in a subsidiary, equity would 
be entitled to claim it. In practice, this would usually mean that creditors 
with share pledges would come forward. Otherwise, the administrator of 
the group entity holding the share could claim preference to such value. 
 
Once all value that can be located in a jurisdiction, entity or asset has 
been situated, that value can be applied to claims with the related 
“priority.” However, inevitably there will be value that cannot be assigned. 
It might be a little. It might be a lot. That will depend on the nature of the 
firm. Whatever is left, however, for whatever reason, be it going concern 
surplus, option value, homeless assets, or value that inheres in the group 
itself, constitutes the rump estate. That residual value is available for pro 
rata distribution across the firm on a global and firmwide basis.  
 
Again, when this approach is applied to cases like Nortel or Lehman, 
the answer is the same, but the result is reached as a simple accounting 
matter, not through exercise of an extraordinary remedy.  
 




In sum, we do not propose any change to the rules of substantive 
consolidation. Quite the opposite. Instead, we argue that the limits of the 
corporate form be respected for distributional purposes. Neither do we 
propose or intend any disrespect to principles of priority. Instead, we seek 
to free both principles from the single waterfall liquidation paradigm and 
adapt them to a global regime with multiple asset and value waterfalls. The 
major conceptual innovation lies in allocating the burden of proof for 
priority. Where the value of a corporate group is realized on a consolidated 
basis, claims to special priority must be proven by the claimant, and the 
priority entitlement is limited to the amount that could have been realized 
by the creditor claiming against the asset or entity alone.  
 
We do not propose anything that should not already be true under 
current law. We simply consider more carefully how to implement these 
principles. On a practical level, however, the implications of our approach 
may be far reaching. For most modern integrated corporate groups, much 
of the value will either be part of the integrated group or will be part of the 
going concern surplus. As a result, a significant share of the value should 
be available for pro rata distribution. 
 
 
